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A bstract: H a-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Econom ic Development: 
Theory, Policy, and H isto ry ’, provides a description and critique of the 
m ainstream  view of institutions and developm ent. It applies well to  Latin America 
in the 1980s and 1990s. H ow ever, the effort to  introduce these Anglo-Am erican 
institu tional structures (Global S tandard Institutions; GSIs) in the 1980s and 
1990s resulted in uneven and unstable econom ic perform ance, no t development.
As a result, the relationship am ong institutions, developm ent and econom ic policy 
in Latin America today has generally moved far beyond this ‘m ainstream ’. The 
institutions to  insure m acro stability have generally been preserved, and some 
countries do  follow GSI prescriptions. H ow ever in m ost countries, especially in 
South America, the effort to  find the right mix of institutions for developm ent has 
moved far beyond this m ainstream . The result has been innovative initiatives to 
address m ore fundam ental developm ent issues such as inequality, p roperty  rights 
and in ternational econom ic institutions. This process is likely to  continue, 
facilitated by the currently robust dem ocratic political systems th a t grew  ou t of 
the earlier turm oil.
1. Introduction
Ha-Joon Chang (2011) provides a cogent critique of the ‘currently dominant 
discourse on institutions and development’ (ibid.: 1), using a large number 
of sources. His main reference is to the W orld Bank, particularly their 
‘Governance M atters’ approach to institutions, as well as his own academic 
writings.
His description and critique apply quite well to Latin America, particularly 
to the Latin America of the 1980s and 1990s. The relation of institutions, 
development, and economic policy in Latin America in 2011 is quite 
different from this ‘mainstream’.1 The effort to introduce the Anglo-American 
institutional structures in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in uneven, unstable and
‘ Email: jameson@economics.utah.edu
I would like to  thank Codrina Rada von Arnim, Marias Vernengo and Penny Jameson for comments on 
an earlier draft.
1 To be sure, mainstream advice is still offered. For example, Timothy Wise (2010) describes a World 
Bank expert extolling the virtue of commercial agriculture after NAFTA and blithely stating that small 
famers could simply move to other employment. This is in Mexico with 57%  of the workforce in the
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questionable development. To be sure, some mainstream institutions were locked 
in ‘by design’, e.g. in free-trade agreements, and more careful macro policy has 
become the norm. Nonetheless, the effort to find the right mix of institutions for 
development has moved far beyond what Chang characterizes as mainstream, 
especially in South America. M ore importantly, this process seems likely to 
continue apace, facilitated by the robust democratic political systems that grew 
out of the earlier turmoil.
2. Institutions and Latin American development under the Washington Consensus
The earlier mainstream institution-building period began with the dictatorial 
imposition of a market-based economy in Chile after 1973. Despite some 
increased social expenditures and attempts to confront Chile’s extreme 
inequality, this market-based, export-oriented, open economy was not 
fundamentally changed when the left-leaning Concertacion came to power in 
1990. This institutional continuity resulted in a 5 percent annual gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rate from 1990 to 2009, compared with the overall Latin 
American rate of 3 percent.
In most of the rest of Latin America in the 1980s, the difficulty of adjusting to 
the transfer of their income to oil-producing countries led to shifting approaches 
to development policy as well as to political instability. The mix was poisonous, 
and the 1980s was truly a lost decade economically.
This led Latin American countries to adopt Chang’s mainstream policy 
package, formulated as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990). This 
step was encouraged, or often imposed on countries, by the W orld Bank, the 
International M onetary Fund (IMF) and the US government. M ost of the seven 
elements of the ‘Global Standard Institutions (GSIs)’ (Chang, 2011: 2) were 
put into place in most of Latin America. Argentina became the poster-child for 
the package and the darling of the international institutions, especially when 
it adopted ‘convertibility’, a modified currency board that severely restricted 
discretionary monetary policy.2
The programs had various descriptions, e.g. Duran Ballen’s ‘modernization’ 
program in Ecuador (1992-1996) or the Franco/Cardoso ‘Plano Real’ in Brazil 
(1994-1995). Their implementation was facilitated by the rise of US-educated 
technocrats to important executive positions, e.g. M exico’s President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) was a Ph.D. graduate from Harvard who was 
succeeded by the Yale Economics Ph.D. graduate Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). 
At a macro-economic level the technocratic institutional reforms were successful,
informal sector. However, in most of Latin America, the audience is no longer receptive to such simplistic 
formulae.
2 Convertibility was one factor in reducing Argentine inflation from 4923 percent in 1989 to 3.8 
percent by 1994.
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relative to the chaos of the 1980s. Inflation stabilized and growth became 
positive. In part this reflected the parallel performance of the US economy, which 
experienced its longest expansion along with a moderation of inflation. However, 
the process of institutional change was not without setbacks, most notably when 
liberalizing the financial system. This led to banking crises in many countries -  
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela in 1994, Paraguay in 1995, and Ecuador in 1996.
Nonetheless, there was profound macro institutional change that nowhere 
in Latin America has been completely reversed; it occurred not through 
‘development’, but from the failures of the 1980s. In some countries, these GSI 
changes were locked in through international agreements, specifically free-trade 
agreements with the USA. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 
signed by the USA, Canada and Mexico) and the bilateral agreement between 
the USA and Chile were the first (January 1994). The most recent is the bilateral 
agreement with Peru in February 2009. Free trade is not an apt description of 
these treaties. They are more investment agreements that subject the countries’ 
economic policy to international regulations, providing exceptional recourse 
to private investors and restricting government support for domestic economic 
actors. They were successfully designed to limit countries’ institutional freedom 
(Chang, 2011: 18).
So, in the 1990s, development policy in Latin America did exemplify the 
mainstream version of institutional change. Argentina carried that banner and 
illustrates that well. Opening its banking system to foreign capital led to 
modernization and to an implicit role of the foreign banks as the lender of last 
resort, replacing the convertibility constrained Central Bank. State enterprises 
were closed or sold to private investors, the union control of the labor market was 
broken, foreign investors were quite attracted to the country, and Argentina’s 
stock market index, the MERVAL, increased dramatically until it hit a high 
of 866 in 1997 (1986 =  0.01). But the model failed. The economy went into 
recession in 1998 and the mainstream institutions were too rigid to adjust. 
Stability increasingly depended on international capital flows, particularly from 
the IMF. Financial turmoil in 2001, along with political uncertainty, led to 
economic and political chaos by the end of that year and a fundamental 
reorientation of the economic model from 2002 on.
The failure of the institutional structure that Argentina had adopted, based 
on the mainstream discourse, resonated throughout the hemisphere, particularly 
in South America. It caused a fundamental re-examination of economic and 
political institutions and a reassessment of the meaning of development. W ithout 
doubt, the homogeneity of the discourse on institutions and development that 
Chang (2011) assumes is not descriptive of Latin America in the first decade of the 
21st century. This is a period of experimentation and innovation in an attempt 
to find institutions appropriate to Latin America’s development needs. Perhaps 
the most tangible indicator of Latin America’s insulation from the mainstream 
model is that none of the major countries have any ‘outstanding purchases or
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loans’ from the IMF that had previously provided the IMF with leverage to 
enforce its mainstream policy package.
3. Institutions and contemporary Latin American development policy
The failures of the 1980s prioritized macro stability and put in place institutions 
designed to accomplish this goal. As a result most of Latin America has weathered 
the current crisis relatively well in terms of growth, inflation and international 
balance. Some have gone further and follow most of the GSI prescriptions. This 
is usually because of a close economic relation with the USA, as in Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, as well as Chile. However, throughout Latin America, and even 
in these ‘mainstream’ countries, identifying the GSI institutions as ‘development’ 
is the exception rather than the rule.3 The limitations and contribution of the 
mainstream discourse to the disarray in previous decades has broadened both 
the definition of development and the range of possible policies far beyond that 
mainstream.
The result has been a vibrant upwelling of institutional innovation and 
experimentation in the interest of ‘development’. This exemplifies the complexity 
of the relation of institutions and development noted by Chang (2011: 21-22) 
and relies on ‘human agency’ to confront the difficulties of institutional change. 
Let us note some of the most important cases.
Chang (2011: 3) notes that ‘GSIs are institutions that inherently favour the rich 
over the poor’. However, since the 1990s there have been a series of institutional 
changes in the mechanisms of social protection in Latin America that together 
represent a creative effort to address this shortcoming of the GSIs. They are 
more consistent with the positions in ‘Washington Contentious’ (Birdsall and 
de la Torre, 1998) than with the Washington Consensus. Traditional social 
security programs were initially complemented by make-work programs to deal 
with extreme poverty. They evolved into social investment funds in a number 
of countries, e.g. Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Jamaica, that allowed decentralized 
local decisions on infrastructure projects and that provided employment and 
community development (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010: 7). Simple transfer 
programs targeted to the poor were also adopted as non-contributory social or 
health insurance programs in many countries. Finally, conditional cash transfer 
programs have expanded, providing a direct transfer to a poor family, contingent 
on a behavioral response such as ensuring that the children attend school or 
obtain required health services (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010: 11-12). These 
institutional changes are profound:
3 For example, in Peru the orthodox Alan Garcia and his predecessor, Alejandro Toledo, are both 
highly unpopular, even though the m acro performance of Peru has been quite good, with the third highest 
growth rate of GDP between 2000 and 2009.
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. . .  the transformation of Latin America’s social assistance system over the 
last two decades or so goes beyond the increase in the monetary value of its 
expenditures. From a situation twenty-five years ago, when social insurance was 
only available to a minority of workers in urban areas, and social assistance 
was limited to a few untargeted food and fuel subsidies, many countries in the 
region have now created systems that distribute resources to large numbers of 
poor people, including in rural areas. In that sense, the system’s effectiveness 
has increased more markedly that fsic] its costs (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010: 
13).
In large measure these programs emanate from the strengthening of 
democratic institutions following the earlier military dictatorships. This is 
another major institutional change that seems robust, despite the challenge 
represented by the coup against President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2009.4 
Another important outcome of democratization has been to give voice to groups 
whose identity and worldview stand in direct opposition to the GSIs. Most 
notable are the indigenous in Ecuador and in Bolivia who have succeeded 
in redefining the countries as ‘plurinational states’ through consititutional 
reforms. This allows the indigenous to oppose private property claims, based on 
communal rights and traditional relationships with the land. This has become a 
basis for resisting private investments in mining, water and oil projects that would 
affect their pacchamama, their mother earth (Jameson, 2011). The reassessment 
of private property has also encouraged those governments to renegotiate natural 
resource concessions that had been granted to international corporations under 
the W ashington Consensus. In the case of Ecuador’s ITT-Yasum oil field, the 
government has solicited international funds to pay to keep the oil in the ground. 
This wedding of carbon-offset economics with indigenous rights and aspirations 
is an exceptional example of institutional innovation beyond the mainstream.
One of the most notable efforts at creating new democratic institutions 
has been the ‘participatory budgeting’ effort begun in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 
1989, and now used in some 150 Brazilian municipalities. Much of the city’s 
construction and service budget is allocated based on a highly decentralized 
process, driven by grassroots participants. Deepti Bhatnagar et al. (2010) 
found that this innovation has resulted in notable improvements in physical 
infrastructure and in access to services.
There have also been innovative trans-national efforts to develop institutional 
structures that operate directly in opposition to the mainstream. Venezuela’s 
oil revenues were put to the service of a number of these efforts. The most 
avowedly anti-mainstream was the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA), which was established on 14 December 2004 and now has nine
4 There was also a coup in Venezuela in 2002, though Hugo Chavez was returned to  power, a planned 
coup in Bolivia in 2008, and a police insurrection in Ecuador in 2010. Only H onduras saw the removal 
of the head of state.
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members plus a number of observers. It is to be ‘a regional alliance committed to 
social, political, and economic cooperation and equality’ (DeFeo, 2010). ALBA 
is far from a viable counterweight to the existing institutions of inter-American 
coordination, and the need to shift resources to domestic issues in Venezuela 
will further weaken it. In any case, it represents an effort to fundamentally 
alter existing institutions. Its first transaction in its clearing currency, the ‘sucre’, 
occurred in July 2010 when Ecuador sold rice to Venezuela and was paid in 
sucres (at 1.25 sucres per dollar) (Mather, 2010).
M ore significant is the 12-member Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR), which came into being in M ay 2008 ‘as a vehicle for economic, 
political, social, and cultural integration’ (NotiSur, 2009: 1). It will be a case 
study of how humans can act to change institutions, avoiding the corner solution 
of fatalism or voluntarism (Chang, 2011: 17). The Union created two sub­
organizations. The South American Defense Council is ‘an entity to strengthen 
mutual trust and consolidate the region as a peace zone’ (NotiSur, 2009: 1). The 
Council may have played a role in encouraging Ecuador’s military to support 
President Correa when he was attacked by elements of the national police 
on 30 September 2010. UNASUR’s representatives met in special session in 
Buenos Aires and affirmed their support for Correa and democratic government. 
They then proceeded to Quito when calm had returned (Planas, 2010: 1). The 
second sub-organization is designed to change the institutional constraints of 
the international financial system. Its vehicle is the Banco del Sur (Bank of the 
South) that was initially capitalized at $7 billion by Latin American government 
contributions. Its goal is to provide autonomy and development financing for 
Latin American projects. At this point it remains in formation, but again is a 
clear effort at institutional innovation, designed to alter the constraints placed 
on Latin America by the mainstream institutions.
4. The potential revenge of the mainstream
While Latin America provides a hopeful counter to the dominance of the GSIs, 
the end result of the institutional innovation that has taken place is far from 
clear. In this, Chang’s warnings about the complexity of institutional change 
are well placed. The old saw that ‘Brazil has a wonderful future -  and always 
will’ may be appropriate for this context. Inequality continues in the extreme in 
Latin America and only if the new social programs fuel true incorporation of the 
marginalized, and mobilization of their potential, will the underlying structure 
be changed. M uch of the current macro-economic success of Latin America has 
depended on commodity booms and discovery of new deposits of minerals and 
oil. This is the traditional Latin American pattern that has never generated the 
long-term economic success that other areas such as East Asia have attained. 
In addition, even though Cuba has recently expanded its private sector access, 
there are ample divisions among the Latin American countries in their economic
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policies. So their ability to withstand a USA that is intent on supporting the GSI 
policies could be severely limited over time. So Chang’s critiques and cautions 
may in the long run dominate the story.
Nonetheless, in comparison with the days of the W ashington Consensus 
version of the mainstream discourse, the vibrancy of institutional innovation 
and change that has characterized the last two decades in Latin America must be 
given its due. It certainly deviates fundamentally from any univocal mainstream 
discourse.
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